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Article
The Possibility of Avoiding Discrimination:
Considering Compliance and Liability
MELISSA HART
The gender discrimination class action Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
whose certification was recently affirmed in the Ninth Circuit, presents a
large-scale challenge to the company's excessive reliance on subjective
judgment in employment decision-making. It is one in a growing number of
similar suits, all of which are fundamentally attacks on the continued
operation of entrenched gender stereotypes in the allocation of workplace
opportunities. The breadth of this aim is one of the strengths of these suits, but
it also raises a significant question: because this kind of litigation targets a
broad social phenomenon, is it reasonably possible to distinguish employers
who are part of the problem from those who are not? This Article argues that,
given the real possibility ofjudicial and public resistance to these suits, there
is a serious need for some articulation of what employer practices would be
sufficient to demonstrate legal compliance sufficient to forestall litigation like
Dukes. Past litigation, the evaluations of human resources experts, and
Supreme Court interpretations of the requirements of federal
antidiscrimination law all provide some guidance as to employer policies that
could satisfy these compliance efforts. But a growing body of empirical
research suggests that workplace programs designed for compliance do not
necessarily improve circumstances for women and minorities. Any discussion
of compliance must grapple with this problem. This Article argues that
employers, and those offering them guidance, must develop strategies for
compliance that will in fact remove barriers to equality, but that litigation like
Dukes may not be appropriate to target employers who have made substantial
compliance efforts, even if those efforts have not eliminated inequalities.
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The Possibility of Avoiding Discrimination:
Considering Compliance and Liability
MELISSA HART
I. INTRODUCTION
It is not really surprising that Wal-Mart is the defendant in the largest
employment discrimination lawsuit in U.S. history. Wal-Mart is, after all,
the largest private employer in the world, with a workforce that is nearly
1% of the U.S. working population.' And Wal-Mart has become notorious
for its unfriendly workplace policies. So, when Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. was certified in June 2004, authorizing the named plaintiffs to
represent more than 1.5 million current and former Wal-Mart employees in
their claims of gender discrimination in pay and promotion, it might have
seemed almost inevitable.
But litigation is never-or perhaps should never be-inevitable. In the
context of federal antidiscrimination law, in particular, the law's primary
goal is arguably "not to provide redress but to avoid harm.",3 If this is truly
the goal of Title VII and other similar laws, it must be possible for an
employer who wishes to do so to comply with the law's obligations and
thereby to avoid liability, and even perhaps to avoid some kinds of
litigation entirely.
The past decade has seen a growing number of large class action suits
challenging the aggregate effects of multiple individual employment
decisions.4 These cases are an extremely important tool for challenging the
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. I would like to thank Rachel Amow-
Richman, Susan Bisom-Rapp, Emily Calhoun, Tristin Green, Martin J. Katz, Scott Moss, Catherine
Smith, Grant Sullivan and Kevin Traskos for their helpful comments, and the participants in and
organizers of the Wal-Mart Matters symposium for a fascinating event.
1 See Ellen Israel Rosen, The Wal-Mart Effect. The World Trade Organization and the Race to
the Bottom, 8 CHAP. L. REV. 261, 262 n.5 (2005); David Neumark et al., The Effects of Wal-Mart on
Local Labor Markets 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11782, 2005), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w 1782.
2 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004). The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the certification decision on February 6, 2007. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007).
Wal-Mart has announced it will seek rehearing en banc. See Wal-Mart to Appeal Discrimination Suit
Status, CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 6, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/02/06/news/companies/walmart/
index.htm.
3 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998); see also Kolstad v. Am. Dental
Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999).
4 Like many of the topics discussed at the Wal-Mart Matters symposium, this is an area where
one could say that you do not need Wal-Mart to study the Wal-Mart effect. See, e.g., V. Sridhar &
Vijay Prashad, Wal-Mart with Indian Characteristics, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1785 (2007); Chris Tilly, Wal-
Mart and its Workers: NOT the Same All Over the World, 39 CoNN. L REV. 1805 (2007).
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subtle but pervasive discrimination that continues to limit women's job
opportunities. The patterns of exclusion and inequality presented in Dukes
mirror patterns that still hamper women's opportunities in many
workplaces. And they are not inevitable or excusable patterns. By seeking
to hold employers accountable for the persistent gender divide in work
opportunities, litigation like Dukes holds transformative potential. In
pushing employers to take steps to counteract the harmful impact of
unexamined stereotypes, these suits destabilize settled assumptions about
the limits of legal change and the inevitability of workplace inequality.
But one of the very things that makes these cases so significant-the
challenge to broad cultural norms-has the potential to undermine their
success. The challenge to widespread cultural stereotypes raises concerns
about where to locate legal boundaries. In particular, cases like Dukes
push us to the question of what an employer can do to avoid liability in
litigation of this sort. Employers have raised the specter that there is no
legitimate way to avoid liability under Title VII if these suits are
permissible, and some courts are clearly bothered by this possibility as
well.
This Article will consider the problem of compliance: What can an
employer do to avoid liability for excessively subjective decision-making
that leads to gender-biased outcomes in pay and promotions? It will first
explore the significance of Dukes and the kind of challenge it mounts as an
important step in antidiscrimination litigation. It will then consider the
standard defense arguments-that only quotas or strict objective tests will
protect them--and will reject those solutions as potentially illegal and
certainly unnecessary. Next, it will explore the kinds of requests that
litigants like the Dukes plaintiffs make-not only for monetary remedies,
but also for structural reforms. It will place those remedial options in the
context of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on employer compliance
with Title VII. Finally, this Article will consider the dilemma presented by
the possibility that compliance is not achieving the goals of equal
employment opportunity. There has been a significant scholarly critique of
the Court's emphasis on employer training programs and other internal
antidiscrimination policies, and recent empirical work raises questions
about the effectiveness of many employer-driven diversity efforts. These
are serious concerns that cannot be ignored, but in spite of these concerns,
compliance efforts and the internal enforcement mechanisms they generate
must be considered as a central element of efforts to limit discrimination in
the workplace.
[Vol. 39:1i623
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II. LITIGATION TRENDS:
DUKES AND OTHER CHALLENGES TO ENTRENCHED STEREOTYPES
Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. is part of a litigation trend that includes
similar suits against well-recognized national retailers like Home Depot5
and Costco,6 as well as dozens of other chain stores, grocery stores and
other relatively large, geographically dispersed employers.7 Each of these
suits raises a challenge to the defendant employer's policy of allowing
local decision-makers to make important employment decisions in a
largely unguided subjective manner. The suits also challenge the
individual results of that unguided decision-making. What these suits are
fundamentally doing is contesting the continued operation of entrenched
gender stereotypes in workplace decision-making.
This Part will begin by briefly describing the claims in Dukes v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., and the facts the plaintiffs focused on to support their
legal claims. Because the allegations in Dukes are typical of the claims
brought in other recent class action suits, they help to illuminate the
particular kind of persistent discrimination such litigation targets. This
Part will then explore the role these suits push employers to play in
challenging entrenched cultural norms.
A. Statistical Disparities, Centralized Policies, and Stories of Bias at
Wal-Mart
In 2001, the Dukes plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of current and former
female employees of Wal-Mart, alleging that for years women at Wal-Mart
stores had been paid less than their male counterparts every year and in
every Wal-Mart region and that they had been denied opportunities for
promotion during that same time and on the same broad geographic scale.
8
The plaintiffs charged that "Wal-Mart discriminates against its female
employees by advancing male employees more quickly than female
employees, by denying female employees equal job assignments,
promotions, training and compensation, and by retaliating against those
who oppose its unlawful practices." 9 They alleged that the retail giant had
5 See Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., No. 94-4335, 1996 WL 421436 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 1996).
6 See Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 372 F. Supp. 2d 530 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
7 See, e.g., Melissa Hart, Learning from Wal-Mart, 10 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 355,372 (2007)
(discussing recent cases involving employment discrimination); Michael Selmi, Sex Discrimination in
the Nineties, Seventies Style: Case Studies in the Preservation of Male Workplace Norms, 9 EMP. RTS.
& EMP. POL'Y J. 1, 2 & n.4, 5 (2005) (same); Michael Zimmer, Systemic Empathy, 34 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 575, 599-600 (2003) (same).
8 See Motion for Class Certification at 1, Dukes. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (No. C-01-2252) [hereinafter Motion for Certification].
9 Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint 2, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137
(N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C-01 -2252) [hereinafter Third Amended Complaint].
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violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 both through intentional
discrimination and through maintenance of policies that, while facially
neutral, operate in a manner that disproportionately harms female
employees and that cannot be justified as necessary to Wal-Mart's
business.'0 They supported these claims with a narrative and a theory of
discrimination that have become increasingly common in efforts to combat
workplace inequality.
The narrative and theory of Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., like those
in other similar litigation, have three central elements: an attack on the
aggregate results of multiple individual decisions; identification of a
number of company policies that either foster discriminatory attitudes or at
least allow them to thrive unchecked; and detailing of anecdotal instances
of explicit gender bias and stereotyping. The plaintiffs' goal is to
demonstrate how the individual decisions that form the basis of the
statistical showing are attributable to the policies and cultural attitudes of
the employer. By making this showing, plaintiffs enable the courts to
evaluate the aggregate consequences of individual decisions and expose
patterns of discriminatory outcomes that might be difficult or impossible to
challenge through individual suits."
The first step in the Dukes plaintiffs' argument was to demonstrate a
statistically significant disparity in pay and promotion between men and
women at Wal-Mart. Plaintiffs' statistical expert looked at men and
women hired at the same time into the same position over a five-year
period and found that, on average, women in hourly positions made $1100
less annually than men. In salaried management positions the annual pay
gap was $14,500.12 Relevant non-discriminatory factors could not explain
these pay differences.' 3 The statistical disparities in promotion of women
at Wal-Mart were similarly stark. Wal-Mart has a large female employee
population at the lowest sales ranks; in 2001, women comprised 67% of
hourly workers and 78% of hourly department managers. 14 The percentage
of women is considerably different, however, in the salaried management
ranks. Only 35.7% of assistant managers, 14.3% of store managers and
9.8% of district managers were female.'
5
As to both pay and promotion, the plaintiffs pointed to substantial
evidence that these disparities are attributable to the unguided discretion
vested in store managers. Wal-Mart's policies for setting pay combine a
fixed base rate for each job with manager discretion for fairly substantial
°Id. 102, 104.
See Hart, supra note 7, at 365.
12 Motion for Certification, supra note 8, at 25.
" Id. at 27-28.
14 Id. at 7.
15 Id.; see also Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 146 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
[Vol. 39:1623
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adjustments. The company "provides no guidance on what circumstances
would justify such an adjustment. Without proper criteria, inappropriate
gender-based factors therefore can, and do, affect pay decisions."' 6 Wal-
Mart offered similarly little information or guidance to managers about
standards for promotion. Opportunities for promotion to most
management positions were not posted; permission to apply for them often
had to be obtained from supervisors; and access was limited by invitation-
only training programs. 17 Evidence suggests that supervisors relied on
difficult-to-define criteria-like teamwork skills and ability to get along
with others-that are especially susceptible to gender bias and
stereotypes.'
8
Other evidence presented by the Dukes plaintiffs showed that, as to
both pay and promotion, Wal-Mart's corporate management consistently
disregarded the developing gender disparities. 19 For example, variations
from a range of "normal" pay for any particular job show up on exception
reports, allowing corporate headquarters to see where significant
differences in pay have developed. While corporate management "is aware
of how its Store Managers are using their discretion" in setting pay "it has
done nothing to rein them in or ensure this discretion is exercised fairly."
20
And the company has been unwilling to engage in monitoring of gender
disparities in compensation.2' As to the gender differences in promotion
rates, consultants hired by Wal-Mart over the years have pointed to the
lack of gender equality in the management levels of the company and a
task force created by the company in 1996 suggested mechanisms for
increasing representation of women in management.22 Wal-Mart ignored
these recommendations and disbanded the group in 1998.23 An internal
group of Wal-Mart women told the company as long ago as 1992 that they
were concerned that gender stereotypes throughout the company were
limiting opportunities for women's advancement. 24 Wal-Mart did not act
on these recommendations and expressions of concern.
The largely unguided and unchecked allocation of pay and promotion
opportunities described by the plaintiffs' evidence is at odds with Wal-
Mart's highly centralized and controlled corporate environment. Both
16 Motion for Certification, supra note 8, at 9.
"7 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 148-49.
18 Id.; see also Motion for Certification, supra note 8, at 25-26.
19 Motion for Certification, supra note 8, at 2.
20
Id. at 19.
21 See Expert Report of Dr.William T. Bielby, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137
(N.D. Cal. 2004) [hereinafter Bielby Report].
22 See Motion for Certification, supra note 8, at 15; Wal-Mart Didn't Act on Internal Sex-Bias
Alert, Documents Show, BLOOMBERG.COM, July 15, 2005, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
71000001 &refer=us&sid=aGS8a.3TSjRQ.
23 See Wal-Mart Didn't Act, supra note 22.
24 Motion for Certification, supra note 8, at 15-16.
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Wal-Mart's personnel management structure and, especially, the
company's corporate culture are tightly managed out of corporate
headquarters in Bentonville, Arkansas. The retail giant's U.S. operations
are divided into forty-one national regions supervised by vice presidents
who meet at least weekly with central corporate leadership in
Bentonville.25  Each region is also covered by a regional personnel
manager, based at corporate headquarters, who monitors personnel policies
and assists in the recruitment and selection of individual store managers.26
The regions are divided into districts, each run by a manager who works
directly with his regional personnel manager on personnel decisions.27
This system connects human resources decisions directly back to corporate
headquarters along several lines.
This centralized personnel structure is one of the tools Wal-Mart uses
to ensure the dissemination of and continued emphasis on its corporate
culture. From the first orientation to mandatory weekly store meetings,
employees are trained in Wal-Mart's culture.28 Store managers use
standardized "corporate 'culture' lessons and accompanying training
materials" to run these meetings. 29  The company newsletter, Wal-Mart
World, includes a section on corporate culture, 30 and Wal-Mart's website
has a section devoted to culture. 31 Every store manager is expected to
monitor a real-time computer link connected to the home office to keep
immediately up-to-date with corporate policy. 32  Moreover, store-level
managers at both Wal-Mart and Sam's Club are frequently transferred
from one facility to another, and even from one state to another.33 This
movement within the company helps to ensure that a consistent message
carries across retail outlets. "By constantly moving people around, the
Wal-Mart blood circulates to the extremities.,, 34  Similarly, Wal-Mart's
strong preference for promoting from within ensures that most managers
25 Id. at 5; see also Cheryl L. Wade, Transforming Discriminatory Corporate Cultures: This is
Not Just Women's Work, 65 MD. L. REV. 346, 366-67 (2006) (describing Wal-Mart's management
structure and noting in particular the expectation that "[e]ach level of management was in 'close and
constant touch."').
26 See Motion for Certification, supra note 8, at 2.
27 See id at 5.
28 See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 151 (N.D. Cal 2004); see also BARBARA
EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA 143-44 (2001) (describing the
orientation process).
29 Motion for Certification, supra note 8, at 11.
30 Bielby Report, supra note 21, at 7.
31 See Wal-Mart Stores, Wal-Mart Culture, http://www.walmartstores.com/GlobalWMStoresWeb/
navigate.do?catg=251 (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
32 Motion for Certification, supra note 8, at 8, 9.
31Id. at 12.
3 See Cora Daniels, Women v. Wal-Mart; How Can the Retailer Reconcile its Storied Culture
with the Anger of These Female Workers?, FORTUNE, July 21, 2003 at 78, available at LEXIS, News
Library, FORTUN File.
[Vol. 39:1623
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will have been "thoroughly steeped" in the company culture.35 Wal-Mart
reinforces this lesson by rewarding commitment to the corporate culture in
evaluation and allocation of opportunities.36
As a final step in their argument, the Dukes plaintiffs offered anecdotal
evidence that business at Wal-Mart was often conducted in contexts that
either explicitly or implicitly excluded women and that women faced
considerable bias at stores throughout the nation. The incident that is
credited with being the impetus for the Dukes class action suit was the
moment when a female store manager saw her male counterpart's paystub
and realized he was making thousands of dollars more than she was for
doing the same job. When this single working mother questioned her
manager about the disparity, he explained that the male employee had a
family to support and therefore was appropriately paid more.37 Another
member of the class said that she was advised that if she wanted to get a
better job at Wal-Mart she should "'doll up' and "'blow the cobwebs off'
her makeup. ' 38  Another testified that her boss repeatedly justified his
favoritism for men by explaining that "God made Adam first., 39  One
woman was discouraged from applying for a position as manager of the
sporting-goods department with the explanation that customers would feel
more comfortable with a man in the position.4 ° Other women reported that
women were generally steered to "traditionally female" departments,
which often came with fewer advancement opportunities. 1 One class
member testified that during an interview she was informed that "it was a
man's world and that men control managerial positions at Wal-Mart.
42
Class members explained that work meetings in stores and divisions
around the country were held at Hooters restaurants and, in some cases, at
strip clubs.4 3 And at meetings of Sam's Club executives, women
employees were regularly referred to as "girls" and as "little Janie Qs."
44
35 See Motion for Certification, supra note 8, at 11-12; see also DON SODERQUIST, THE WAL-
MART WAY: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE SUCCESS OF THE WORLD'S LARGEST COMPANY 39-40 (2005).
36 See Motion for Certification, supra note 8, at 11; see also ROBERT SLATER, THE WAL-MART
DECADE 109 (2003) (quoting current Wal-Mart CEO as saying "[y]ou have to be less tolerant of people
who don't get the culture").
37 See LIZA FEATHERSTONE, SELLING WOMEN SHORT: THE LANDMARK BATTLE FOR WORKERS'
RIGHTS AT WAL-MART 16 (2004); see also Third Amended Complaint, supra note 9, 65, (describing
another employee who was told that a male co-worker was paid more "because he had a family to
support").
38 Third Amended Complaint, supra note 9, 64.
39 Daniels, supra note 34, at 78.
40 Third Amended Complaint, supra note 9, 57.
41 Id. 93.
42 Id. 52.
43 Daniels, supra note 34; see also Geri L. Dreiling, The Women of Wal-Mart (2004),
http://www.altemet.org/rights/19901/ (describing one female employee's experience with repeated
visits to strip clubs on business trips).
44 Motion for Certification, supra note 8, at 6.
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The pieces of the Dukes plaintiffs' narrative fit together to describe an
environment with a very strong and central corporate culture that emanates
directly out of headquarters and that requires managerial compliance with
all sorts of directives, but without any kind of attention to or concern about
gender bias in promotion and compensation. The anecdotes of
discriminatory attitudes and biased treatment at Wal-Mart stores around
the country portray a culture that permitted or even encouraged local
managers to act on stereotypes and bias in exercising discretion on pay and
promotion decisions. And the statistical inequities in both compensation
and management opportunities demonstrate that Wal-Mart's corporate
decision to remain at best indifferent to concerns of gender equality in the
workplace had real consequences for its female employees.
B. Potential for Challenging Culturally Entrenched Stereotypes
There are obviously elements of the Dukes plaintiffs' narrative that are
entirely unique to Wal-Mart. The basic framework of the challenge,
however, is much the same as that in Ellis v. Costco, where plaintiffs allege
that an entirely subjective system with no written standards for doling out
promotion opportunities has blocked women from the higher paying
management positions,45 or Butler v. Home Depot, where a system that
granted a largely male supervisory staff the discretion to make decisions
about pay and promotion allegedly kept women in lower paying, lower
status positions at the company,46 or Shores v. Publix Super Markets,
where women were allegedly relegated to low-paying positions and denied
access to management at the grocery store chain by a system of pay and
promotions that relied on the unguided discretion of supervisory
personnel.47 In all of these cases, and in many others,48 the pay and
promotion policies being challenged "have as a common feature that they
have entrusted to managers very broad discretion to make promotion and
compensation decisions with little or no oversight." 49 This is a core theme
in recent Title VII class litigation, and it is this aspect of the claims that
45 Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 372 F.2d 530, 533 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
46 Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., No. C-94-4335 SI, 1996 WL 421436, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25,
1996).
47 Shores v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., No. 95-1162-CIV-T-25(E), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3381,
at "15 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 1996).
48 See, e.g., Palmer v. Combined Ins. Co., 217 F.R.D. 430, 435 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (seeking
certification of class challenging employer's central policy of delegating unfettered discretion and
ignoring consequences); Beckmann v. CBS, 192 F.R.D. 608, 614 (D. Minn. 2000) (describing
challenge to a centrally formulated and disseminated personnel policy that leaves discretion to
individual managers to make personnel decisions); see also Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking
and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REv. 741, 787 n.247 & 248 (2005) (collecting cases).
49 Motion for Certification, supra note 8, at 16.
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gives them great potential as a tool to push on the glass ceiling that
continues to limit women's opportunities at work.
These claims of excessive subjectivity in decision-making are attacks
both on the employer practices that allowed subjectivity to intrude into
workplace decisions and on the substantive content of the subjective
judgments being made. The former is a challenge to particular workplace
policies of the defendant employer. So, for example, the Dukes plaintiffs
point to Wal-Mart's failure to post training and promotion opportunities;
its lack of clear written criteria for advancement, evaluation and pay
differentials; and its residual reliance on a willingness to relocate as a
requirement for management positions as specific policies and practices
that make the retail giant an appropriate litigation target. As one of the
plaintiffs' experts has explained, the difficulty with these employment
practices is that they have "structured the decision-making context in ways
that allowed cognitive bias to place women at a systematic
disadvantage." 50 Among the plaintiffs' litigation goals is to force Wal-
Mart to adopt policies that will limit the opportunity for bias and stereotype
to intrude into workplace decisions. They are challenging what Susan
Sturm has described as "second generation discrimination" that is
"structurally embedded in the norms and cultural practices of an
institution ' 51 and are seeking institutional reforms that will disrupt
persistent patterns of inequality.
These challenges attack not only what Michael Selmi has described as
"corporate indifference to gender inequality, '52 but also the stereotypical
attitudes of the individual supervisors who have been making decisions at
the company for years. In this regard, class action claims challenging the
aggregate effects of unguided subjective decision-making are attacks on
gender stereotyping and bias more generally. 53 They contest not only the
institutional culture of a particular workplace, but also the widespread
stereotypes and biases that exist outside the workplace and that are
imported into worksites through individual decision-makers.
so William T. Bielby, Can I Get a Witness? Challenges of Using Expert Testimony on Cognitive
Bias in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 377, 385 (2003).
5' Susan Sturm, Lawyers and the Practice of Workplace Equity, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 277, 280-81;
see also Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 458, 468 (2001) [hereinafter Sturm, Second Generation Discrimination] (defining
second generation employment discrimination).
52 Michael Selmi, Sex Discrimination in the Nineties, Seventies Style: Case Studies in the
Preservation of Male Workplace Norms, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 1, 46 (2005); see also Tristin K.
Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment
Theory, 38 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 145 (2003) (noting that recent litigation focuses on "the
employer's role in enabling the forms of discriminatory bias that hinder opportunities of women and
minorities in the modem workplace").
53 I explore this aspect of the claims in more detail in Hart, supra note 7, at 372-74.
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These claims require for their success that workplace decisions be
evaluated in the aggregate. Looking at broad swaths of pay and promotion
decisions reveals patterns of inequality that may be masked if decisions are
considered in isolation.54 The decision whether or not to certify a class to
pursue these claims is therefore fundamental. Many district courts have
certified class action suits that challenge the consequences of unguided
subjective decision-making, recognizing, as both the district court and the
Ninth Circuit did in Dukes, that an employer can have corporate policies
that tolerate and even encourage the operation of stereotypes in decision-
making and that the widespRread discrimination that results is properly
attributable to the employer. Others have viewed these claims as simply
an impermissible effort to aggregate dozens or hundreds of individual
claims with the class action device.56
Underlying the decisions from courts that have been unwilling to
certify these class action suits is an anxiety about holding employers liable
on a class-wide scale for the type of discrimination at issue in these claims.
As one court has put it, "a decision by a company to give managers the
discretion to make employment decisions, and the subsequent exercise of
that discretion by some managers in a discriminatory manner, is not
tantamount to a decision by a company to pursue a systemic, companywide
policy of intentional discrimination .... The concern reflected in these
comments is with the move from holding a single manager responsible for
his stereotyped decisions (or even finding the employer liable for this
individual bias under established standards of proof in individual
discrimination cases) to holding the employer responsible for the aggregate
of many managers' decisions. A core element of this concern is that it may
be difficult to distinguish an employer that should be held liable under this
theory from one that should not. Are employers obligated to eliminate
stereotypes from all decision-making in the workplace in order to avoid
this kind of aggregate liability, or simply to make legitimate efforts to do
so? How can we tell when an employer is doing enough?
54 See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 150-51 (N.D. Cal. 2004); see also
Sturm, supra note 51, at 469 ("[B]ehavior that appears gender neutral when considered in isolation may
actually produce gender bias when connected to broader exclusionary patterns.").
55 See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214, 1231 (9th Cir. 2007); Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at
150-51; see also Hart, supra note 48, at 787 n.247.
56 See Hart, supra note 48, at 787.
57 Sperling v. Hoffrnan-LaRoche, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1346, 1363 (D.N.J. 1996); see also Wright v.
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 526, 541 (N.D. Ala. 2001) ("[T]he purported class is comprised of
a large group of diverse and differently situated employees whose highly individualized claims of
discrimination do not lend themselves to class-wide proof."); Robertson v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., No.
397CV1216(GLG), 2000 WL 33381019, at *5 (D. Conn. July 5, 2001) ("[W]hat we have here are
evaluations and decisions made by hundreds of supervisors and managers on a variety of things besides
promotions, such as job assignments, salary determinations, merit increases, etc. From a practical
standpoint, it is impossible to put these all under one roof.").
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III. AVOIDING LITIGATION LIABILITY: WHAT SHOULD EMPLOYERS Do?
Class actions challenging the results of excessive subjectivity in
employment decision-making raise fundamental questions about the
responsibility employers should have for eliminating or minimizing the
impact of persistent gender stereotypes when they operate at work. The
considerable potential of these suits to challenge widespread cultural
norms has a flipside that presents a significant question: because this kind
of litigation targets a broad social phenomenon, is it reasonably possible to
distinguish employers who are part of the problem from those who are not?
This question presents a formidable challenge and contributes to judicial
resistance to recognizing these claims at all. Given the real possibility of
continued-or even increasing-judicial resistance to this type of
litigation, there is a serious need for some articulation of what employer
practices would be sufficient to demonstrate legal compliance sufficient to
forestall a suit like Dukes.
My concern here is not so much with remedies in litigation, but with
whether there are steps an employer can take to avoid liability, or even to
avoid litigation altogether and whether those same steps will necessarily
diminish workplace inequality. The topics are certainly not unrelated, and
the question of what litigation remedies are appropriate in these cases is
also very difficult and hotly contested.5 8 Some have noted that in many
instances employment discrimination lawsuits appear to be simply
opportunities to transfer money from one party to the other in
compensation for past wrongs, rather than serious catalysts for workplace
change.59 Others who are perhaps more optimistic have pointed to the
inclusion of "systemic prospective relief aimed at reducing future
discrimination" in consent decrees approving settlement in several cases.6 °
It is clear that, even taking this more optimistic view, once the discussion
is focused on remedies in litigation, money becomes a central element of
the conversation.
Perhaps for that reason, among others, recent scholarship has
emphasized the role that employers, consultants and non-litigation arbiters
58 Much of the litigation in Dukes, particularly in the appellate arguments in the Ninth Circuit, has
been focused on the appropriateness of a remedial scheme that allocates money damages to class
members based on a formula, rather than based on individualized proof of damages. Wal-Mart has
asserted that this formulaic allocation of damages is unconstitutional, and that courts' use of such a
model calls the legality of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 into question. The Ninth Circuit rejected
these arguments in affirming the certification decision. See Dukes, 474 F.3d at 1237-42. While the
arguments surrounding damages allocation are fascinating, they are beyond the scope of this paper.
59 See, e.g., Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment
Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1249, 1300-01 (2003).
60 Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace Context: Title VII as a Tool for Institutional Reform, 72
FoRDHAM L. REV. 659, 688 n. 129 (2003); Sturm, Second Generation Discrimination, supra note 51, at
529-30; Sturm, The Practice of Workplace Equity, supra note 51, at 280-81.
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have come to play in crafting solutions to continuing discrimination.6'
Increasingly, it seems possible that the best hope of organizational-and
consequently societal-change in this arena may come from outside
litigation. At the same time, litigation and the significant threat it poses to
employers will likely always play a fundamental part in forcing change
that might otherwise be considered too costly or too complicated.
Moreover, independent of this coercive potential, there is the possibility
that the remedies plaintiffs seek in litigation, the expert reports that inform
those remedial requests, and consent decrees from settled cases can
provide guidance to employers and consultants seeking pre-emptive
workplace reform. Thus litigation and non-litigation solutions should not
be considered as entirely independent and neither is likely to be entirely
sufficient.
This Part will examine a range of compliance alternatives, including
the steps defendants incorrectly assert that they would have to take in order
to avoid class action lawsuits as well as solutions that plaintiffs and courts
have proposed in litigation. It will then consider how tight the relationship
is and should be between eliminating inequality and avoiding liability.
That is, if an employer adopts the kinds of policies that plaintiffs, experts
and courts are suggesting as tools for the elimination of stereotype and bias
in decision-making and yet statistical disparities persist, should the
employer be liable under Title VII in a Dukes-type suit or not?
A. Quotas and Objective Testing: The Defendants' Parade of Horribles
Defendants warn of a "parade of horribles" if courts begin to permit
class action challenges to the aggregate impact of excessive unguided
subjective decisionmaking. 2 They assert that, if claims like those made in
Dukes are allowed, employers will be pushed into one of two unpalatable
choices: the adoption of quota systems to avoid the statistical imbalances
that support the claims or the rigid elimination of all subjective elements of
employee selection and evaluation.63 Neither of these options is viable and
so, employers suggest, the claims themselves must not be legitimate.
Defendants are about half correct. Neither quotas nor strictly objective
testing is a workable solution in the current legal and political context. Not
only is there widespread opposition to quotas as a matter of social policy,
but Title VII quite explicitly states that nothing in the statute should be
61 See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process: Toward an Incentivized
Organizational Justice Model of Equal Employment Quality for Caregivers, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 25;
Sturm, Second Generation Discrimination, supra note 51, at 566.
62 See JOCELYN LARKIN & CHRISTINE E. WEBBER, CHALLENGING SUBJECTIVE CRITERIA IN
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interpreted to require employers to give preferential treatment to members
of a protected class because of an existing workforce imbalance in
representation of that class among its employees. 64  And experience
teaches that when employers do adopt quotas to avoid statistical
imbalances in workforce representation of different groups, they may face
legal challenges to the quotas themselves. 65  Further, the Supreme Court
has made it clear that even employer-initiated affirmative action plans are
66valid only if they do not involve strict numerical quotas. Thus, any
interpretation of Title VII, or any claim made under the statute, that
required an employer to adopt a strict statistical balance of men and
women in particular positions would be unlikely to survive scrutiny.
The elimination of subjective aspects of selection and evaluation of
employees would face similar attack. Every federal court of appeals has
recognized that "subjective evaluations 'are more susceptible of abuse and
more likely to mask pretext."' 67 Courts have also been careful, however, to
acknowledge that "[h]onorable employers frequently use subjective criteria
... [i]ndeed, in many situations they are indispensable to the process of
selection in which employers must engage. 68  The Supreme Court has
very explicitly endorsed the use of subjective evaluations, emphasizing that
"[s]ome qualities-for example, common sense, good judgment,
originality, ambition, loyalty, and tact--cannot be measured accurately
through standardized testing techniques."69  Thus, an argument that
subjective elements of employment decision-making should be eliminated
entirely is unlikely to carry much weight in any court. Moreover, for much
the reasons the courts have recognized, a shift to purely objective testing
would not make sense as a matter of employment policy. In most job
categories, there are aspects of qualification for the position that are not
amenable to objective measure and eliminating their consideration would
diminish the ability of employers to select qualified employees.
64 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(j) (2000); see also Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 652
(1989) ("The only practicable option for many employers would be to adopt racial quotas, insuring that
no portion of their work forces deviated in racial composition from the other portions thereof; this is a
result that Congress expressly rejected in drafting Title VIL"); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,
487 U.S. 977, 992-94 & n.2, (1988) (the Court of Appeals's theory would "leav[e] any class of
employers with 'little choice' but to engage in a subjective quota system of employment selection.
This, of course, is "'far from the intent of Title VII").
65 See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 755 (1989) (discussing annual racial hiring goals
challenged under Title VII).
' See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 309 (2003) (stating that "universities cannot
establish quotas for members of certain racial or ethnic groups"); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 272
(2003); Johnson v. Santa Clara Trans. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 616-17 (1987).
67 Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 798 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Fowle v. C&C Cola, 868 F.2d
59, 64-65 (3d Cir. 1989)); see also Hart, supra note 48, at 767 n. 132 (listing a host of federal court
decisions warning of the discriminatory potential of subjective evaluation methods).
68 Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudson Co., 804 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986).
69 Watson, 487 U.S. at 991.
20071
CONNECTICUT LA W REVIEW
Further, an employer who trades all subjective evaluation for an
entirely objective system of testing puts itself at risk of litigation for that
decision. Title VII law entitles employees to challenge employer practices
that have a disparate impact on a particular group. To succeed in a
disparate impact claim, an employee must identify a particular practice and
then show that the challenged practice has a statistically significant
negative impact on members of a protected class.7 ° While not all objective
evaluation systems have this kind of disparate impact, the risk is not
inconsiderable. 71  And in order to avoid the risks associated with a
disparate impact challenge to an objective test, employers have to spend
considerable resources validating the tests and ensuring that they are
consistent with the employer's business necessity. Making this kind of
showing would be particularly complicated in a circumstance where the
employer in fact believes that a different measure-one with some
subjective element-would produce outcomes more consistent with
business needs.
B. Best Practices?: Workplace Policies that May Reduce the Negative
Effects of Stereotype and Bias and Limit the Risk ofLiability
Defendant employers are correct that neither quotas nor elimination of
subjectivity is a viable solution to the problems targeted by class action
suits challenging the aggregate impact of excessive subjectivity in
decision-making. They are not necessarily correct, however, that these are
the only employer practices that could decrease the negative effects of
stereotyping and bias at work. In fact "[1]ists of 'best practices' in
diversity management have proliferated recently., 72 Moreover, remedies
proposed by plaintiffs in litigation and often incorporated into consent
decrees suggest steps employers might take to avoid lawsuits like Dukes.73
The kinds of changes often voluntarily made by employers facing these
suits-the kinds of changes Wal-Mart has made in the past few years-
provide similar guidance. As well, some of the Supreme Court's recent
70 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2)(k) (2000); New York City Trans. Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568,
568-69 (1979); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
71 See, e.g., Michael Selni, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701,
705-06, 755 (2006) (noting evidence that most written tests have some disparate impact).
72 Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate
Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 AMER. Soc. REV. 589, 589 (2006). See generally UNITED
STATES EQUAL OPPORTUNITY CoMMIssIoN, BEST PRACTICES OF PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYERS
(1998), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/taskreports/practice.html. In this context, a "best
practice" is generally understood to mean a practice that "promotes equal employment opportunity and
addresses one or more barriers that adversely affect equal employment opportunity." Id.
73 See Green, supra note 60, at 705 (noting that "consent decrees like those recently agreed upon
can provide valuable foundational information for other organizations seeking to avoid Title VII
liability").
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Title VII jurisprudence offers instruction to employers about
implementation of antidiscrimination training and prevention programs as
an important aspect of compliance.
These diverse sources offer some consensus about areas in which
workplace regulation may help to both prevent discrimination and limit the
likelihood of liability in litigation. These areas include neutral and well-
advertised posting of management positions and training opportunities;
written standards of both expectation and evaluation; monitoring and
appraisal of workplace statistics; and antidiscrimination policies and
training. Of course, no check-list of policies will or should automatically
insulate an employer from liability for discrimination. Courts must
consider how policies in fact operate in the particular context of a given
workplace. But the practices described here may offer a starting point for
considering what kinds of basic steps employers should be taking to reduce
the likelihood of stereotyping in workplace decisions. And it seems quite
likely that an employer that implements this range of practices will be less
susceptible to class litigation challenging organizational discrimination.
This Part will elaborate on these employer practices and their relevance in
a few notable recent cases, including Dukes.
1. Advertising and posting positions
One of the most commonly criticized employer practices that tends to
permit subjective judgments to limit women's opportunities is the failure to
make job opportunities widely available through posting and some form of
objective initial screening of applicants.74 A central allegation of the
Dukes litigation, for example, was that the retail giant allowed individual
supervisors to select candidates for management training and other
promotion gateway opportunities through a "tap on the shoulder., 75 This
kind of selection system for training and promotions is extremely likely to
replicate the existing composition of managerial ranks.76  Instead,
employers seeking to eliminate subtle discrimination in the workplace
should maintain some form of neutral, public job posting that
"communicates clear and accurate information to employees about the
training and experience required to become eligible for a job, about job
74 See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Shores v. Publix
Super Markets, Inc., No. 95-1162-C1V-T-25(E), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3381, at *31-32 (M.D. Fla.
Mar. 12, 1996); Abigail Goldman, Costco Manager Files Sex-Bias Suit, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2004, at
CI, available at LEXIS, News Library, LAT File.
" See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 148; Motion for Certification, supra note 8, at 8.
76 See, e.g., Bielby Report, supra note 21, at 11; Scott A. Moss, Women Choosing Diverse
Workplaces: A Rational Preference with Disturbing Implications for Both Occupational Segregation
and Economic Analysis of Law, 27 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 1, 32-33 (2004).
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conditions, and about how the job fits into a career path in the
organization. 77
Since the Dukes suit was first initiated, Wal-Mart seems to have taken
substantial steps toward such a publicly available posting system.78
Similarly, the settlement decree in the Home Depot litigation included
implementation of a less subjective promotion application process in which
employees and applicants would enter their job preferences into a
computerized database, which would automatically place qualified
applicants into an interview pool.79 In the wake of the Wal-Mart class
certification decision, at least one major employment defense firm
explicitly recommended to its clients that it "adopt or modify a posting
system so that promotional opportunities (or more of them) are publicized
internally., 80 While publicizing promotion opportunities will not eliminate
subjectivity in assessment of candidates for these opportunities, it will at
least give women the opportunity to apply for senior positions that, in a tap
on the shoulder world, they often never learn of at all.
2. Establishing written standards
An emerging consensus about best practices for equal employment
opportunity also focuses on the need to develop written standards for
evaluation and to require supervisors conducting evaluations to provide
explanations in writing. Without written guidelines, neither those doing
evaluations nor those being evaluated know what measures are being
applied. This information vacuum allows different standards of evaluation
to be applied to different candidates and diminishes accountability.
The absence of written criteria may also be a significant factor in class
litigation. For example, the allegations in Ellis v. Costco focus in
substantial part on the fact that the warehouse store does not provide
written criteria or procedures for filling its highest-paying store
management positions and that, as a consequence, "[c]andidates who
aspire to these positions often have little or no idea how these positions are
filled or what they need to do to obtain them."'8 When senior management
does describe the promotion criteria, these criteria are highly subjective. 2
Wal-Mart's approach has been much the same, with individual managers
applying their own assessments of the criteria most relevant for promotion.
7 Bielby Report, supra note 21, at 15.
78 See Wal-Mart Didn't Act, supra note 22.
79 See Green, supra note 60, at 684.
go James J. Oh, Dukes v. Wal-Mart: A Foreboding Class Certification Decision For Employers,
ASAP, (Littler Mendelson, Chicago, Il.), July 2004, http://www.littler.com/collateral/print/A59F4COF
A2B09CDB3COF709269E2D5BE.html.
81 Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and Appointment of Counsel at 1, Ellis v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2103 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2007) (No. C-04-3441).
2 Id. at 9-10.
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Factors like "teamwork, ethics, integrity, ability to get along with others,
and willingness to volunteer," which some managers at Wal-Mart
described as the standards they used for doling out advancement
opportunities, are concededly relevant to all kinds of jobs, but evaluation
of those qualities is likely to be biased "unless they are assessed in a
systematic and valid manner, with clear criteria and careful attention to the
integrity of the decision-making process. 83  Requiring managers to
provide written explanations for decisions may counter the operation of
unthinking bias because it will require them to articulate the reasons for the
decision. Similarly, "requiring a supervisor to anchor an evaluation of a
particular skill or characteristic of an employee with examples of specific
observed behaviors rather than vague impressions can diminish the
influence of subconscious stereotyping.,
84
Written standards can also counteract misunderstandings about
corporate policies or preferences that have discriminatory impact. Without
written standards, outdated policies that have been abandoned in part
because of their impact on women or minority candidates can have
continuing detrimental effects as they live on in practice if not in formal
policy. In Wal-Mart's case, for example, there was evident internal
confusion about whether higher-level management positions required a
willingness to relocate anywhere in the country. It is clear that the
company's original policies required a willingness to relocate, and in fact
that new managers were consistently relocated around the country.85 That
official policy seems to have been dropped in recent years, but testimony
from the Dukes litigation makes clear that some evaluating supervisors still
consider it to be one of the requirements for promotion.86 Since it had been
recognized even within Wal-Mart itself that this policy disadvantaged
female applicants for management positions, clear written directives about
its discontinuation would have been one step to opening more promotion
opportunities to women.
3. Establishing Antidiscrimination Policies and Education
Of all the possible employer responses to the problem of
discrimination, the one that has received the most sustained attention is the
development of antidiscrimination training and internal prevention
programs. This is the one area in which the Supreme Court has
83 Bielby Report, supra note 21, at 14. Supporting this general perspective, legal scholarship on
cognitive bias and its effects at work draws on and contextualizes a well-developed body of
psychological research documenting the intrusion of biases into workplace decisions. See, e.g., Linda
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1186-1211 (1995).
84 LARKIN & WEBBER, supra note 62, at 8.
85 Bielby Report, supra note 21, at 18.
1
6 Id. at 17-18.
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affirmatively suggested that employers may avoid liability (or at least
decrease their liability risks) through policy implementation. No doubt at
least in part as a consequence of the Court's encouragement, employers
have been fairly aggressive in implementing antidiscrimination education
and prevention policies.8 7 But these are also, as I discuss further below,88
the kinds of employer policies that have received the most sustained
skeptical review from scholars evaluating their effectiveness as a
mechanism for challenging workplace inequalities.
What guidance there is from the Supreme Court on the measures an
employer can take to comply with the federal law's antidiscrimination
mandates focuses primarily on when an employer will be held vicariously
liable for sexual harassment undertaken by a supervisor. In that context,
the Supreme Court has recognized that Title VII was intended not only to
provide a cause of action to injured employees, but also to "encourage the
creation of anti-harassment policies and effective grievance
mechanisms. '' 89  In a pair of 1998 decisions, the Court held that an
employer would be vicariously liable for supervisory sexual harassment,
but that the employer could avoid liability if it could demonstrate (1) that it
had taken effective steps to prevent harassment and to correct for
harassment if and when it was made aware of it; and (2) that the
complaining employee had unreasonably failed to take advantage of
available preventative or corrective measures. 9° In a similar vein, the
Court held in 2000 that an employer would not be liable for punitive
damages if it engaged in good faith efforts to comply with Title VII and
that an employer's creation of antidiscrimination policies and education of
its employees about the importance of these policies would constitute such
good faith.91
Even before these Supreme Court opinions offered incentives to
employers to establish antidiscrimination training and prevention policies,
diversity training was a relatively popular human resources practice among
larger companies.92 The theory behind this training is that if you sensitize
people to the problem of stereotyping and suggest behavioral changes that
will cut down on the incidence of bias, you may be able to reduce the
negative effects of these phenomena.93 Over the past three decades,
companies have also grown increasingly likely to have established
87 See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105
COLUM. L. REv. 319, 335-36 (2005).
" See infra Part III.C.
89 Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
90 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 764; see
also Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 145-46 (2004).
91 Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 545-46 (1999).
92 See, e.g., Kalev et al., supra note 72, at 593.
9' See id
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procedures for addressing complaints of discrimination internally.
Creation or enhancement of this type of internal program is a common
component of consent decrees settling class action discrimination claims.
4. Monitoring and Ensuring Accountability
A consistent message in evaluating the efficacy of employer efforts to
reduce workplace discrimination is that any program must include strong
central support and clear channels of accountability. 94 In order to be most
effective, internally driven antidiscrimination practices must involve "a
process of self-assessment that would lead to genuine accountability and
organizational self-monitoring." 95  Regular monitoring and oversight of
how promotion criteria are developed and applied is essential to
diminishing the discriminatory effects of stereotyping in workplace
decisions.96 One of the most troubling among the employment practices
challenged in Dukes was Wal-Mart's unwillingness to acknowledge and
assess available information about pay and promotion disparities or to
address the perceptions of its female employees that gender discrimination
limited their opportunities in the company.97 Available research shows that
the negative impact of bias and stereotyping on employment decision-
making "can be minimized when decision-makers know that they will be
held accountable for the criteria used to make decisions, for the accuracy of
the information upon which the decisions are based, and for the
consequences their actions have for equal employment opportunity.
9 8
Thus, organizations that incorporate evaluation of patterns of
segregation or differential status by gender into their personnel systems are
94 See, e.g., U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, BEST PRACTICES OF PRIVATE
SECTOR EMPLOYEES 7 (1997), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/task-reports/practice.html
[hereinafter GOOD FOR BUSINESS] ("Management must have a positive and unequivocal commitment to
equal employment opportunity. Without commitment from top-level management to front-line
supervisors, nothing can reasonably be expected to be done."); U.S. GLASS CEILING COMM'N, GOOD
FOR BUSINESS: MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION'S HUMAN CAPITAL 39 (1995).
95 Susan Sturm, Race, Gender and the Law in the Twenty-First Century Workplace: Some
Preliminary Observations, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 639, 676 (1998). More than a decade ago, the
federal Glass Ceiling Commission made the point that any successful effort to shatter the glass ceiling
would include CEO support, an emphasis on accountability, explicit confrontation of preconceptions
and stereotypes, mechanisms for tracking progress and a comprehensive scope. GOOD FOR BUSINESS,
supra note 94, at 39.
9 See, e.g., Kalev et al., supra note 72, at 592 (noting that "[s]cholars and consultants alike advise
ongoing coordination and monitoring of diversity progress by dedicated staff members or task forces").
97 Similar allegations were made in Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp. See Plaintiffs' Motion for
Class Certification and Appointment of Counsel, supra note 81, at 15-16.
98 Bielby Report, supra note 21, at 19; see also Green, supra note 52, at 147; Christine Jolls &
Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969, 986-87 (2006) (discussing
mechanisms for "debiasing," including prohibitions on implicit bias). Courts have long recognized this
as an option for safeguarding against bias. See, e.g., Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 499 F.
Supp. 427 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
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more likely to catch troubling patterns of inequality relatively early.
Similarly, monitoring employees' perceptions of the workplace culture
may counter "subtle forms of bias and related problems not immediately
apparent from analyses of more objective workforce data."99 For these
reasons, human resources experts recommend that companies designate
specific individuals or committees with explicit responsibility for
monitoring diversity progress and concerns.' °° Further, settlement decrees
in employment discrimination cases regularly require the creation of
systems to monitor employment decision-making patterns and often
include outside review processes.''
C. What if Compliance Does Not Work?
An employer that adopted a human resources policy incorporating this
range of "best practices" would be extremely unlikely to face serious risk
of liability under a theory like that presented in Dukes. If these kinds of
practices are in fact working to diminish the discriminatory consequences
of stereotyping and bias, then it seems entirely appropriate that employers
would not be liable for class claims seeking structural reform.' °2
Moreover, even absent clear evidence that these practices are working to
eliminate discrimination, courts are unlikely to find employers responsible
for class-wide discrimination when they have adopted policies that track
what many have identified as "best practices." But what if the issue is not
an absence of evidence that certain policies do work and instead the
existence of evidence that they do not? In this Part, I will consider what
the link can and should be between the effectiveness of compliance efforts
for equal opportunity goals and their effectiveness for liability prevention.
Dukes, like other similar suits, challenged the aggregate effects of
unguided, excessively subjective decision making. The theory behind the
suits is that the employer practice of permitting unguided subjectivity
allowed the stereotypes and biases of individual managers to intrude into
workplace decisions. An employer that established written standards for
evaluation, that required written explanations for evaluation and that
99 Bielby Report, supra note 21, at 24; see also LARKIN & WEBBER, supra note 62, at 7-8; GOOD
FOR BUSINESS, supra note 94, at 40.
100 See, e.g., GOOD FOR BUSINESS, supra note 94, at 39-40; Kalev et al., supra note 72, at 592-93.
101 Green, supra note 60, at 685-86 (describing consent decree provisions in several cases). As
Michael Selmi has noted, there may be good reason to look to outside monitoring rather than creating
diversity review processes that report only internally. Selmi, The Price of Discrimination, supra note
59, at 1327-28.
102 Liability for intentional discrimination in individual cases is a separate question. One could
certainly imagine a workplace that operated on terms that forestalled a class action claim challenging
the aggregate effects of unguided subjectivity in decision-making but in which individuals might still
face occasional instances of discrimination. My focus here is exclusively on class action litigation
seeking structural reform.
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monitored the outcomes of pay and promotion decision-making would not
be guilty of permitting "unguided" decision making. An employer that
ensured posting of positions, with publicly available minimum standards
and careful attention to a decision maker's obligation to explain his
decisions would be less likely to suffer the problems that attend excessive
subjectivity in selection of candidates for hiring or promotion. So there is
a chance that an employer who adopted these types of policies would have
created a workplace in which stereotypes and bias were visibly the
exception to general practice. This assumption is one of the principal
justifications for the liability theory in suits like Dukes, which allege that
the absence of these employer practices is responsible for the operation of
continued stereotyping and bias in allocation of opportunities.
Moreover, it is this assumption, at least in part, that undergirds the
Supreme Court's vicarious liability decisions. In holding that training and
prevention programs should limit an employer's liability for the
discriminatory acts of its employees, the Court emphasized that Title VII's
primary goal was "to avoid harm."' 10 3 If an employer is making reasonable
efforts to limit the harm that Title VII seeks to prevent, the Court reasoned
it should be "give[n] credit" for those efforts.'0 4  But what if this
assumption proves wrong? What if "best practices" either have no impact
on diversity in the workplace or even have negative consequences for
women's employment opportunities?
A wave of recent scholarship on diversity training programs has raised
the concern that these programs are enabling employers to avoid liability
despite the fact that they do little to actually diminish stereotypes and bias
in the workplace. 10 5 These critics of what sometimes appears to be
unexamined judicial deference to the existence of employer
antidiscrimination policies raise a number of powerful cautionary points
about the risks of reliance on these internal mechanisms for enforcement of
the equality ideals embodied in federal antidiscrimination laws.
Some note that the Supreme Court's justification for its liability
standards-that the existence of antidiscrimination programs will reduce
the incidence of discrimination-rests on an empirically testable
103 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998).
104 id.
105 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94
CAL. L. REV. 1, 28 (2006); Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention is a Poor Substitute for a
Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in
Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3 (2001); Susan D. Carle,
Acknowledging Informal Power Dynamics in the Workplace: A Proposal for Further Development of
the Vicarious Liability Doctrine in Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Cases, 13 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 85, 86-87 (2006); Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final
Triumph of Form over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 3, 3 (2003);
Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 197-98 (2004).
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assumption that has not truly been tested and that may very well prove to
be incorrect.'0 6 If an employer is to avoid liability because of the existence
of these policies, it should perhaps only be if the policies in fact work to
reduce discriminatory conduct. 0 7  Without some attention to this issue,
there is a risk that internal programs will be merely "symbolic responses-
responses designed to create a visible commitment to law, which may, but
do not necessarily, reduce employment discrimination."' 8 In fact, a recent
empirical study offers evidence that diversity training does not lead to an
increase in diversity.'0 9 To the extent that this evidence undercuts the
proffered justification for doctrines that limit liability because of these
programs, it might be cause for rethinking those doctrines.
Others make the related point that the judiciary's acceptance of
employer-created training and prevention programs carries the risk that
self-regulation will descend into deregulation." 0  Sociologist Lauren
Edelman and her colleagues have conducted significant empirical
evaluations of the ways in which implementation of antidiscrimination
laws through internal human resources managers tends to shift the focus of
the laws to a more managerial approach and how these internal shifts are
then exported into judicial understandings of compliance."' Other
concerns include the risk that, by letting employers off the hook for
admittedly egregious incidents of discrimination by individual employees,
courts are limiting the law's ability to address that underlying
discrimination and may even be masking its occurrence. 12 And, finally,
there is some disturbing evidence that the existence of antidiscrimination
and anti-harassment policies can have unintended negative effects in the
106 See Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The Implications of Social
Science Research on Imputing Liability to Employers for Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 273, 275 (2000); Susan Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: The
Questionable Embrace of Employee Sexual Harassment Training by the Legal Profession, 24 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 147, 148 (2001); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan Fiske, Behavioral Realism in
Employment Discrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1017-19 (2006).
107 Krieger & Fiske, supra note 106, at 1061 ("When a court, like the Supreme Court in Faragher
and Ellerth, justifies its adoption of an affirmative defense to otherwise meritorious harassment cases
on the grounds that anti-harassment training programs and grievance procedures will prevent
harassment from occurring, social science evidence on this question is of undeniable import in
evaluating the defense's merit as a normative legal rule.").
'08 Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of
Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. Soc. 1531, 1542 (1992); see also Bisom-Rapp, supra note 106, at 23-24
(discussing the risk that diversity training becomes "mere window dressing").
109 Kalev et al., supra note 72, at 590, 604.
110 Estlund, supra note 87, at 337.
1 See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Trans/brmation of Civil
Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 497, 499 (1993).
112 See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in Employment
Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 962 (1999).
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workplace by reinforcing stereotypes or exacerbating underlying
tensions.' 13
There has been less empirical research done of other "best practices"
for equal employment opportunity. The recent study that demonstrated
little positive impact from diversity training did show significant positive
results when employers adopted structures of accountability, such as
diversity committees or staff positions and affirmative action plans.'
4
When courts are evaluating the reasonableness of employer efforts to
counter discrimination in the workplace, this kind of empirical information
should inform their analysis. As the relative effectiveness of different
programs becomes better known, an employer's decision to adopt a less
effective alternative in lieu of one with demonstrably better outcomes starts
to seem less reasonable.
Given the information currently available, for example, caution about
the unthinking embrace of internal employer training and prevention
efforts is essential. Certainly, the mere existence of an antidiscrimination
policy or educational program-or of any other practice-should not
automatically insulate an employer from liability. Wal-Mart, for example,
was not completely without any diversity programs or initiatives, but the
programs it did have in place were (especially compared with its to-the-
minute operations more generally) haphazard and underemphasized.1 5
Courts must be able-and willing-to conduct some independent
evaluation of the effectiveness of an employer's policy in assessing what
kind of impact it should have on liability." And training and prevention
programs should be tied to other organizational practices designed to
minimize the negative impact of stereotyping and bias in employment
decisions.
Ultimately, though, if an employer has adopted the kinds of policies
that experts-even plaintiffs' experts-recommend as best practices for
meeting the demands of equal employment opportunity, there will be a
point at which liability under a class-wide structural theory of
11 Bisom-Rapp, supra note 106, at 29-41; see also Kalev et al., supra note 72, at 604.
14 Kalev et al., supra note 72, at 590; see also Susan Bisom-Rapp, Margaret S. Stockdale & Faye
J. Crosby, A Critical Look at Organizational Responses to and Remedies for Sex Discrimination, in
SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 280-83 (Faye J. Crosby et
al. eds., forthcoming 2007) (describing success rates of employer compliance efforts); Susan Sturm,
The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 29 HARv. J. L. &
GENDER 247 (2006) (describing a program at the University of Michigan that produced measurable
results in improving women's experiences and opportunities in the sciences through internal
mechanisms of accountability and inclusion).
15 Bielby Report, supra note 21, at 22-25.
I 6 See, e.g., Williams v. Spartan Communications, 2000 WL 331605, at *3 (4th Cir. Mar. 30,
2000) (No. 99-1566) (looking at the context in which an antidiscrimination policy was disseminated
and concluding that it did not meet the employer's affirmative defense because the employee
reasonably believed the employer was not committed to the goals expressed in the policy).
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discrimination will not be appropriate. This may be true even if the kinds
of programs an employer has adopted have not led to the kinds of diversity
gains that proponents of equal opportunity would hope for. If suits like
Dukes are to continue to survive, courts will want to know how to
distinguish an employer whose policies and practices are in line with the
requirements of the law from those whose policies are not. A precise
elaboration of where that distinction lies may not be possible, but
consciousness about the existence of the distinction should frame both
litigation arguments and compliance recommendations.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Wal-Mart gender discrimination litigation may never get to trial.
It is statistically most likely, in fact, that it will not do so. If the
certification decision survives further review, the case will probably settle.
Employment discrimination class actions almost never actually get tried. 117
But Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. will have had a significant impact even
if it never does go beyond class certification. The case has received
considerable media attention, and Wal-Mart's reform efforts, implemented
largely in response to the litigation, have also generated press attention.
Research suggest that employers, with increasingly sophisticated personnel
advisors, are likely to look at the efforts of other companies in determining
what employment policies make sense for avoiding discrimination
litigation and liability. So perhaps the Dukes litigation will ultimately have
contributed to a better understanding of the contours of compliance in this
central and complex area of equal employment opportunity.
In any event, those supportive of claims like Dukes must have
responses to the concerns raised by employers and skeptical courts about
the limits of antidiscrimination law. I believe that part of that effort must
include some recognition that it is possible for an employer to structure its
workplace in such a way as to avoid liability in this type of litigation. This
is not to say that an employer would be immune from any form of
antidiscrimination litigation, but rather that it could take steps to
substantially eliminate the risk of this particular kind of litigation, which
pushes the employer to adopt structures that counter the effects of cultural
stereotypes and bias in the workplace. Without some notion of what an
employer whose workplace culture and policies complied with the
requirements of Title VII would look like, there is a significant risk that
courts will react against the apparently unbounded nature of these claims.
17 See Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L. REV.
813, 814 (2004).
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